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Media theory loves its threes 1 . Marshall McLuhan wrote his dissertation on the 
medieval trivium of grammar, rhetoric, and logic (2003 [1941]); Friedrich Kittler 
emphasized three media functions of processing, storage, and transmission in a book 
about three devices, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999), which he mapped onto 
Lacan’s three registers of real, imaginary and symbolic; Lewis Mumford (1963 [1934]) 
split the history of technics into three ages: eotechnic, paleotechnic, and neotechnic; 
John Durham Peters (2009) wrote about a “media studies triangle” of text-audience-
industry (outside of which we find the “civilizational” media theory of Innis, 
McLuhan, et al.) In this very issue, W.J.T. Mitchell (2017) suggests a “rule of three” 
about what he sees as “the only three great orders of media”: images, sounds, and 
words. I could go on… 
 
It’s not hard to see the attraction to threes: in mathematics, Pythagoras showed the 
formal elegance and structural integrity of three – no surprise Pythagoreans thought 
the triad to be the noblest digit; in social theory, Freud split us into Id, Ego and 
Superego, while the backbone of Marxian theory is a three (when we remember that 
the base beneath the superstructure is made up of forces and relations of 
production); Mitchell (2015) reminds us of a great many other triads in the history of 
thought via Piece, Barthes, Aristotle, and Hume, among others; there are three jewels 
at the heart of Buddhism (Buddha is affiliated with yellow, Dharma with blue, 
Sangha with red), which correspond to the three primary colours our eyes can see; in 
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Hinduism, there is the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, and then of course 
there is Christianity’s Trinity of Father-Son-Holy Spirit. Maybe all of this has 
something to do with the way we experience and understand time as past, present, 
and future. I’m not sure, but someone should write a media history of the triad (or 
maybe it would be a triad history of media theory): more complex than two but not 
so unruly as four. 
 
This journal would be a good venue for such a project, but I am after something 
different. I want to focus, instead, on the concept that would be at the heart of such 
an inquiry: imagination. Triads are imaginative experiments with drawing seemingly-
incongruent items together. They forge surprising connections and offer frameworks 
for understanding. They are paradigmatic of media theory’s long and rich history of 
conceptual modelling, speculative thinking, and experimental writing. Triads thus 
invite a consideration of the importance of imagination to media-theoretical research 




Imagination is a lovely concept to think with, but it’s all too rarely that we accept its 
offerings. It is a rich and complicated concept. Like media, culture and communication, 
we can trace through its history of usage many of the great intellectual and 
philosophical debates of the western tradition. It shows up constantly in thinking 
about thought. John Ruskin claimed imagination to be “the grandest mechanical 
power that the Human intelligence possesses, and one that will appear more and 
more marvellous the longer we consider it” (Ruskin, 1846: 161). Shakespeare thought 
about imagination a lot, such as in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: 
 
And as Imagination bodies forth 
The forms of things Unknown, the Poets pen 
Turns them to shapes and gives to airy nothing, 
A local habitation, And a name. 
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And we find it at work in Genesis Chapter 6, verse 5: “And GOD saw that the 
wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts 
of his heart was only evil continually.” 
 
So sometimes imagination is dangerous and sometimes it is beautiful. And 
sometimes it’s a vein to be tapped: great poets, painters, and architects are said to 
‘capture the imagination.’ Still other uses suggest imagination not as a substance to be 
captured but as something that envelops, like ether or air: the modern imagination, the 
Western imagination or Canadian imagination. We know how fraught and contested such 
categories are. Raymond Williams famously said that culture was one of the two or 
three most confusing and contested words in the English language (Williams, 1983: 
87); surely imagination is not far behind. 
 
Imagination is, like all the best words, difficult to contain. No sense in even trying. 
Rather than define imagination, or capture yours, I am hoping to glean from some of 
the ways it travels through media theory. Gleaning has the advantage of opening up 
new possibilities for old words. It’s a worthwhile endeavour, I think, because it’s rare 
that we incorporate imagination into our scholarship and teaching. It seems to lack the 
empirical or analytical rigour that we demand of ourselves and our approaches. Our 
default setting is to be cold and diagnostic, safe in our critical and historical distance. 
But what might imagination bring us that other analytic concepts or approaches don’t? 
 
Media theory offers a rich archive for considering this question. In fact, I think one 
of the defining characteristics of media theory is that it has been as much about 
imagination, over the years, as anything else. It’s right there on the second page of 
McLuhan’s preface to The Gutenberg Galaxy2, but, more importantly, it’s an engine 
that has kept media-theoretical debates humming along for at least sixty years and 
probably longer. So, my topic is not a specific text or object, but media theory itself, 
which is an intellectual formation that takes ‘imagination’ as both object and method. 
 
But I have another fish to fry. I’ve been wondering for a while where the literary 
stream of media theory has disappeared to. Here, my inspiration comes in part from 
Erhard Schüttpelz (2016), who recently suggested that media theory emerged in the 
1950s as a “bastard child” of communication studies (in both its engineering and 19  
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social scientific senses), anthropology, and literary studies. The communication and 
anthropological influences get a lot of attention, but the literary ones have lately been 
fading away. This is curious, given so much of media theory’s incubation was in 
literature departments, and that its unique prism of analysis was cut from the literary 
cloth. 
 
What I have in mind is not what’s happening in Digital Humanities (DH) programs. 
What I call literary are approaches to thinking about media, communication, and 
technology that employ methods of close (not distant) reading and that opt for depth 
of analysis rather than breadth. This is not a polemic against DH, which has taught 
us a lot about literature and culture. Nor is what I have in mind about posthuman 
subjectivities – in fact it’s not about the subject at all. In the traditions I have in 
mind, ways of thinking, speaking, and doing are positioned as relays in larger media-
technical infrastructures that do not privilege human bodies (though they may pass 
through them). Discourse and texts are understood not as founts of human meaning 
but as indexes or traces of technical systems that structure ways of knowing3. This 
literary stream is an essential element in the soil from which media theory grew, and 
as the gazes of our colleagues from elsewhere in the humanities turn toward our 
objects and methods, we should develop a proper morphology of that soil. 
  
 
Imagination as Object 
First: imagination as object, an idea captured in two pithy, and by now legendary, 
quips: James Carey’s characterization of the telegraph as “a thing to think with, an 
agency for the alteration of ideas” (Carey, 2009: 157, emphasis added); and Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s dictum that “our writing tools are also working on our thoughts” 
(quoted in Kittler, 1999: xxix, 203, and 204, emphasis added). I bold with and on 
because the gulf between these words is everything between two traditions of 
thinking about media, one pragmatist and generative, the other existentialist and 
diagnostic. A central question of media theory – the relation between technology and 
thought – shows up here in two senses: with Carey, it’s posed as: (1) How do media 
(re)shape imaginative frameworks by which people conceive of themselves and their 
relationships (with other people, tools, institutions, and the natural world)? Put 
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another way: Media here provide metaphors. With Nietzsche, the question is: (2) What 
role do media play in structuring the conditions by which thought is possible at all? 
They here shape language, which is for Nietzsche the context in which thought itself 




1) Media History 
Carey’s essay is of course a masterclass in demonstrating the intellectual and social 
effects of technology. He shows the telegraph to have wide-ranging implications for 
language (emphasizing concision and economy; revealing language as a code; 
inspiring new literary experiments from, for example, Hemingway, who was 
“fascinated by the lingo of the cable”), for finance (after the telegraph, markets 
become geared toward abstract futures), for space (communication at a distance 
overcomes bodily limitations to an unprecedented degree), and for time 
(standardized time zones impose order on a chaotic rail system). Carey uses the word 
sparingly, but what he’s talking about is imagination: the way people think of 
themselves, their jobs, each other, and their environments, which are all reconfigured 
by the telegraph. An emerging imaginary (technical? telegraphic? logistical?) connects 
each of the phenomena Carey describes: economical prose, futures markets, rapid 
signal traffic, and standardized time zones alike. The telegraph is not here the driver 
of historical change, but it provides new metaphors and models for thought, it 
provokes new fears and desires, and each of these make a difference. 
 
I point to Carey’s essay not just because it is so well-known, but because it is 
paradigmatic of this historical vein of media scholarship. There are, of course, many 
other examples – from Harold Innis and Michelle Martin to more recent work by 
Jonathan Sterne and Lisa Gitelman. These approaches carefully sift through archives 
to understand complex webs of social, political, and institutional activities within 
which techno-cultural imaginaries, and the devices they produce, take shape. These 
are literary thinkers but their texts are documents and grey literature; they mine 
archives to understand imagination. 
 
So that’s one track – I call it Media History for simplicity’s sake but I am not 
enamoured of this term. (I wanted to call it social media history, but that now describes 21  
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something quite different). Another track, running parallel, takes imagination as its 
object, though it comes at it from another angle. 
 
 
2) Discourse Networks 
I’ll call this second track, again for lack of a better term, the discourse networks 
approach of McLuhan, Friedrich Kittler, and more recent thinkers like Cornelia 
Vismann. “Discourse networks” is the translation of Kittler’s (1990) term 
aufschriebesysteme, which translates literally as inscription system. I’ll take a bit more 
time to explain this stream because it does not always benefit from Carey’s lucid 
prose. 
 
This stream is no less historical but is much less about History, if I can put it that way. 
It uses methods from disciplines other than History to think about the past. Its 
primary texts are literary rather than archival. It inverts Media History’s method by 
mining imagination to understand archives and technological change. 
 
This is what McLuhan meant when he claimed art to be an “early alarm system” of 
technological change (2003 [1964]: 16). Figures like Shakespeare, Thomas Nashe, and 
T.S. Eliot, he argued, teach us as much about the shift from manuscript culture to 
the Gutenberg galaxy and beyond as Gutenberg himself (or his apparatus). In 
crashing these thinkers and time periods together, McLuhan hot-wired linear 
historical narratives about culture and technology. The resulting ‘mosaic’ approach 
shows how linear type and standardization break up imagination, which he 
understood in medieval terms as “that ratio among the perceptions and faculties 
which exists when they are not embedded or outered in material technologies. When 
so outered, each sense and faculty becomes a closed system. Prior to such outering, 
there is an entire interplay among experiences” (McLuhan, 1962: 300). The story of 
modernity for McLuhan is the splintering of imagination and outering of the senses 
into apparatuses. These produce new, competing environments of perception. In the 
Gutenberg galaxy, structures of knowledge and institutions take root that privilege 
the reading eye over the listening ear, and which mirror the linear logic of type found 
on the printed page. 
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McLuhan thought that literary texts were most interesting not for their meaning or 
content, but because they are unique traces of historical shifts in sensory and 
imaginative life. This mode of reading was picked up by Kittler, who was an even 
more extraordinary reader. McLuhan went straight from the Gutenberg galaxy to 
electric media, skipping over the emergence of technical media like the gramophone, 
daguerreotype, film camera, and typewriter. Kittler filled these considerable gaps 
while also performing a decisive inversion of McLuhan: it is not that media are 
extensions of Man, said Kittler, but that Man is an extension of media. Media 
technologies and networks are more than outered human senses, or expressions of 
human will. They delineate and structure the imaginative space within which we 
think, act, and do. We come to know our bodies and minds only through the media 
technologies that structure them. Concepts and imagination are media effects, for 
Kittler, not the other way around. 
 
Kittler agreed with McLuhan that the zone most privileged for detecting and 
exploring these historical paradoxes is literature. To demonstrate his thesis and 
infuriate his colleagues, Kittler ransacked German literature for bizarre, forgotten 
texts by unknown authors and obscure oddments by famous scribes. These he 
parachuted – often in their entirety – into his texts without traditional explanation or 
commentary. Kittler cared nothing for authorial intent, social context, narrative and 
thematic meaning, or any other traditional objects of literary analysis. “In lieu of 
philosophical inquiries into essence,” he wrote, “simple knowledge will do” (Kittler, 
1999: xl). This dictum is usually understood as a defence of number against the 
humanities’ unfounded suspicion of quantification (how quickly we forgot, he always 
said, the centrality of mathematics to the history of painting, sculpture, and music). 
But it also captures his approach to literary analysis. 
 
In the Kittlerian mode, there is no unmasking of the world of illusions, no decoding 
of hidden ideological messages, no performance of the virtuoso critic. The mode is 
to read words on the page, as they are; not to go digging for meaning, but to 
recognize how texts operationalize the media logics in which they are produced. He is 
at his most lucid (at least in English), when he writes in the Preface to Gramophone, 
Film, Typewriter, “[This book] collects, comments upon, and relays passages and texts 23  
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that show how the novelty of technological media inscribed itself into the old paper 
of books […] What writers astonished by gramophones, films, and typewriters – the 
first technological media – committed to paper between 1880 and 1920 amounts, 
therefore, to a ghostly image of our present as future” (Kittler 1999: xl). 
 
In the Gramophone chapter, Kittler makes a jarring jump cut from his own prose to 
a 1916 story by Mynona (pen name of Salomo Friedlaender) called “Goethe Speaks 
into the Phonograph” (Kittler, 1999: 59-66). Friedlaender’s protagonist is Professor 
Abnossah Pschorr, inventor of the “telestylus” and technical engineer of the highest 
order. We also meet Anna Pomke, Pschorr’s assistant and object of affection, who is 
too enamoured of Goethe’s poetry to notice the Professor’s technological 
achievements. To win her affections, Pschorr devises an apparatus that he believes 
can capture and conquer the fount of Geothe’s poetry and power: his voice. This 
involves raiding Goethe’s tomb and taking a wax model of the poet’s larynx. Pschorr 
uses it to build a dummy larynx that, he says, will reproduce “the timbre of the 
Goethean organ as deceptively close to nature as possible” (1999: 63). 
 
But this is not just mimicry. Pschorr aims to take Anna to Weimar and place the 
apparatus in Goethe’s study, where, he assures her, vibrations from the poet’s voice 
still faintly echo. “I want to suck those vibrations through the larynx,” he tells a 
baffled archivist when they arrive (1999: 63). Pschorr receives permission, and his 
apparatus works. It faithfully captures, amplifies, and records (via phonographic 
needle) physical vibrations made by Goethe’s voice. This pulls Anna only further 
under the poet’s sway. The Professor broods on the train journey home. Realizing 
his mistake – that Anna has been transfixed by Goethe’s voice rather than the 
sublimity of his device – he tosses the technical means of connecting Anna and 
Goethe out the window. With the channel now gone, Anna’s affections for the 
Professor immediately flower. (As Winthrop-Young points out, Kittler rarely passes 
up opportunities to irk his critics by reducing human relationships to crude couplings 
– bodies of desire are analogous to plugs and sockets in his sexual circuitry of human 
affairs. See Winthrop-Young, 2011). 
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In Kittler’s reading, Friedlaender’s story is a media effect in both what it represents, 
and how. “Friedlaender correctly delineated the new constellation of eroticism, 
literature, and phonography” and his story “conjures up the technological past in the 
shape of Germany’s ur-author in order to predict the transformation of literature into 
sound” (Kittler, 1999: 59). In other words: Pschorr’s victory over Goethe stands in 
for technical media’s victory over the “epoch of writing.” Sound recording 
technology – like the gramophone and Pschorr’s apparatus – break up writing’s 
monopoly over imagination and expression. For millennia, writing was the only 
means humans had to reliably store and transmit cultural knowledge (which Kittler 
sees, correctly, as data). To store a sound was impossible. All you could do was 
describe it in writing, i.e. pass it through the bottleneck of the symbolic. But with the 
gramophone comes the ability to record sonic vibrations from physical reality and 
play them back at some point in the future. Writing’s monopoly over sensory 
experience is no more. The poet is reduced to mere mortal. The technically savvy 
professor takes his place at the switchboard of power over imagination, which has 
become data processing. “[…] [F]rom the arts to the particulars of information 
technology and physiology – that is the historical shift of 1900 which Pschorr must 
comprehend” (Kittler, 1999: 72). Paradoxically, literature is the medium through 
which we understand the end of its monopoly over imagination. 
 
This mode of reading saw Kittler skip over all kinds of nuance regarding power and 
politics along the lines we are used to working with. He has been rightly taken to task 
for this (see Peters in Kittler, 2010: 1-17 and Winthrop-Young, 2011: 120-145 for an 
overview of critiques). But his discoveries about literature still demand our attention. 
Primary among these is that the objects found by traditional textual analysis 
(narrative, theme, character, ideology, mytheme, etc.) are not the only ones there for 
consideration. Through his mode of media-technical analysis, we learn about epochal 
shifts in the nature of culture and civilization, which are everywhere and always 
technical, grounded in changes to the processing, storage, and transmission of data. 
Literary texts document these changes in motion; they do not simply represent these 
shifts but they are themselves evidence of them. As Kittler writes, “…we are left only 
with reminiscences, that is to say, with stories. How that which is written in no book 
came to pass may still be for books to record. Pushed to their margins even obsolete 
media become sensitive enough to register the signs and clues of a situation” (Kittler, 25  
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1999: xl). Texts and the imaginations that produce them bear the imprint of their 
media epoch. It’s the job of the critic and theorist to read them in such a way. 
 
Kittler is often framed as a technofetishist, but there are few as committed to 
erudition and close reading as he was. And this reading mode, in spite or because of 




3) Imaginary Media 
Some such thinking falls under the rubric of imaginary media, which is my third 
example of media theory that takes imagination as an object. Like media 
archaeologists, theorists of imaginary media are interested in forgotten histories and 
archival oddments. They locate gardens of forking paths where the historical 
trajectory of technology might have been otherwise – ideas that mediate impossible 
desires and so die on the vine (or were never meant to live at all): The Soviet internet 
that wasn’t (Peters, 2016); an algorithm that produces new songs based on the 
totality of Canadian folk music (Svec, 2016); da Vinci’s helicopter device; the 
doomsday clock (suddenly back in the world with a vengeance). These imaginary 
media invite us to ask “what if?” They invite reflection on what we ask of 
technology, what we project onto it, and how those expectations change. They bring 
into focus dominant assumptions – not just about media and communication, but 
about how we conceive of history, present, and future. In so doing, imaginary media 
seek to reframe our relationships to each other, technical devices, the natural world, 
and the divine or ineffable. Peter Blegvad (2008) brilliantly noted that hands folded 
in prayer are one of the most simple but significant imaginary media as they establish 
a channel for the transmission of “devout aspiration” (discussed in Kluitenberg, 
2011: 58). 
 
Imaginary media are often about folds – how desires and fears from earlier historical 
moments reappear in unexpected ways to complicate linear media histories. Even 
actually-existing media accumulate layers of imagination. A clock is not simply a 
clock, as Eric Kluitenberg, like Mumford (1963 [1934]) before him, argues. It has 
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variously been imagined as: (1) a device that imposes onto the world the regularity of 
the divine; (2) a conceptual model for the movement of the heavens; (3) an object 
that embodies the strength of human achievement; (4) an oppressive device that robs 
living labour of time (2011: 49-50, 57-58). These meanings do not replace or 
subsume but graft onto one another. In 2017, the clock is all of these things 
simultaneously. It thus offers insight into imagination not only in terms of fictional 
or impossible desires, but also regarding the conditions of imagining. “The question 
of imaginary media,” according to Parikka, “is what can be imagined, and under what 
historical, social and political conditions?” (2012: 47). 
 
Much more can, has, and should be said about imaginary media (see especially 
Kluitenberg et al., 2006). For now, let’s emphasize that in addition to mediating 
impossible desires and thus teaching us about historical imaginaries, theories of 
imaginary media challenge narratives that see technological development as a straight 
arrow of progress, or which understand media only in terms of use.  
 
That’s three ways that media theory takes imagination as an object. We might have 
assumed at the outset that thinking about thought would plant us squarely in the 
realm of ideas. But we’ve seen how media-theoretical thinking takes ideas out of the 
clouds, grounding them in material, discursive, and technical contexts. We land on 
the plane of technologies and techniques, hands, mechanisms and inscription 
surfaces – elements that for centuries were ignored by historians and philosophers.  
 
 
Imagination as Method 
Now, to imagination as a method. I’ll spare you another triad and focus on writing 
and textual production. Experimenting with form and style has long been part of 
media theory, and it’s worth opening a conversation about how and why. 
 
Let’s start with Harold Innis, whose work was stylistically peculiar. Throughout the 
1920s and 30s, Innis conducted extensive field work for his economic histories of 
Canada. He called this dirt research, which is a term I like because it captures (or 
conjures) something about the gritty realism of the knowledge he sought. It was field 
work that went beyond ethnography. It paid as much attention to geology and 27  
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biology as to culture, to non-humans as to humans (hence his 1930 book, The Fur 
Trade in Canada, starts with a 5-page ethology of the beaver). It is about impressions 
and enumeration rather than thick description or analysis; ontics, rather than 
ontology (see Young, 2017). Innis sought to let the dirt of place imprint itself on 
him, as Peter van Wyck argues in his beautiful and unjustly-neglected book, The 
Highway of the Atom (2010: 198). (One wonders what Kittler might have thought 
about Innis trying to embody something like Freud’s mystic writing pad in this way 
and at this time.) 
 
Innis’s late communication texts (ca. 1948-1952), for which he is now most widely 
known, echo the scattershot style of his field notes. Empire and Communications (1948), 
The Bias of Communication (1951), and his unfinished History of Communications 
manuscript (2014) were apparently produced, at least in part, using a cut-up method 
– more than a decade before William S. Burroughs popularized it. There’s even some 
evidence that he experimented with early photocopy technology to facilitate this cut-
up method (Chisholm, 1970; Watson in Innis, 2007 [1948]: 16). He’d cut sentences 
from the photocopies and rearrange them on a new page, often without adding any 
connective tissue (or citing the original source). I wonder how playing around with 
their order and arrangement spurred his thinking. It certainly falls in line with his 
habit of reading several wildly divergent books at the same time so as to open his 
mind to surprising connections. (McLuhan joked about using a similar technique, 
“reading only the right-hand page of serious books” in order to combat their 
“enormous redundancies.” This, he said, kept him “very wide awake filling in the 
other page out of my own noodle,” Telescope, 1967). 
 
Innis’s motivations for the cut-up method are mysterious. Whatever they were, the 
effect of the style was to both confuse and inspire (which are not always, or ever, so 
different). The communication texts are hard to read – everyone agrees on this. They 
are fast, disconnected, and unsystematic. James Carey described this style as akin to a 
poem, “an infernal quotation machine of indirect speech – with its author elusively 
hidden within it” (Carey, 1999: 84). The connection to poetry is not such a stretch. 
Innis was after, I think, a generative rather than analytical bias, a style to counterblast 
what he called the mechanization of knowledge – the standardization of thinking that 
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would sap its power. He makes us, as readers, work for it. And we are the better for 
it. 
 
That almost all media theorists are indebted to this style (whether they know it or 
not), is a testament to its power. McLuhan’s “probes” and mosaic approach are 
direct descendants. He crashed incongruous elements together to see what new 
pathways for thinking such collisions might open. McLuhan didn’t only theorize 
“cool” media, he wrote in precisely this way – replacing rigour with creativity, 
refusing to be didactic, inviting readers to think, and thus demanding we become 
active. Kittler’s jump cuts extend this style, as I described earlier, and imaginative 
experiments continue: Cornelia Vismann’s book, Files, formally enacts the 
acceleration of data processing that is the topic of her book. Early chapters about 
antiquarian techniques of file management are long, detailed, and syntactically 
complex. As the book moves forward in time, explanatory detail and connective 
tissue between ideas become more scarce. Sentences are short. She mirrors, 
stylistically, what she describes: the increasing obsolescence of humans in data 
circulation and management. The complexity and speed of the final chapter – which 
folds together Babylonian clay tablets and the digital computer and clocks in at 4 
pages – almost exceeds the ability of a human reader to keep up. 
 
For a final example, let’s return to Nietzsche’s famous words: “our writing tools are 
also working on our thoughts,” which may have been written on a typewriter but 
were certainly written under its influence. 
 
Nietzsche turned to this bizarre mechanical writing ball [see Fig.1] as his vision 
deteriorated. Its discrete alphanumeric characters snapped letters into place, one at a 
time, and untethered writing from his hand. Kittler suggests this caused Nietzsche’s 
writing to move “from arguments to aphorisms, from thoughts to puns, from 
rhetoric to telegram style” (1999: 203). He clacked violent truths from the machine, 
like bullets, and Kittler argues further that it was this mode of writing that revealed 
genealogy to Nietzsche as a method of historical analysis – that the writing ball’s 
deconstruction of words into individual keystrokes showed the essential contingency 
of language, knowledge, and concepts previously unquestioned. Once language and 
the authorial subject go, any stable conception of ideas, history, or God melts away. 29  
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As Kittler writes, “under conditions of media the genealogy of morals coincides with 
the genealogy of gods” (Kittler, 1999: 211). It is no coincidence that genealogy 
continues to be a touchstone for literary media theory. 
 
 
Figure 1: Malling-Hansen Writing Ball, ca. 1878 
 
 
Each example in this montage exhibits experimentation with literary and poetic 
devices: aphorism, digression, metaphor, juxtaposition, and analogy, among others. 
These techniques resist standardization, which is a deep ethic that unites media 
theorists from Nietzsche to Innis, Kittler, Vismann and beyond. To break free from 
old habits is to explode the horizons of thought in any given historical moment; not 
just to diagnose media environments and structures of power, but to imagine 
alternatives. 
 
This task is increasingly urgent. Global logistical systems, emergent artificial 
intelligences, and other new forms of computation, commerce, and governance 
annihilate traditional modes of understanding and organizing life and labour on the 30  
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planet. We are in need of different metaphors, concepts, and modes with which to 
understand the systems that enframe us. Literature and literary media theory have 
been sounding this alarm for some time; we would do well to heed their call. This 
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1 An earlier version of this essay was delivered as an opening address at the annual conference of the 
Communications Graduate Caucus, Carleton University, 16 March 2017. My thanks to Michael Morse 
and Chris Russill for comments on earlier drafts. 
2 “Such a change [from print to the electric age] is not a difficult matter in itself, but it does call for 
some reorganization of imaginative life” (McLuhan, 2011 [1962]: 3). 
3 What I describe as ‘literary media theory’ is similar to what Pryor, Trotter et al. (2016) explore as 
‘technography’ – writing that is not only about technology but is also aware of its own technicity. I’m 
sticking with ‘literary media theory’ to preserve focus on media theory as a field, and because the 
thinkers explored here all use the word media rather than technology or machine. (This conceptual choice 
– to understand media instead of technology – would make for another worthy study). 
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